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ANTI-FEDERALISTS, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, AND THE BIG ARGUMENT
FOR UNION
AKHIL REED AMAR*
In what follows, I shall make some rather smallish points
about the Anti-Federalists. l Toward the end, I will try to make
up for my pointillism by making a rather big claim, one that
moves a bit away from the topic of this panel, the Anti-Federal-
ists, and says something about the general topic of this sympo-
sium, The Federalist Papers. To anticipate my one big argument
at the end: I think that all of us in this symposium have missed
perhaps the biggest argument for union in The Federalist Papers.
You will not find it in the excerpts of The Federalist Papers circu-
lated for this conference. You will not find it in The Federalist
Number 10 and you will not find it in The Federalist Numbers 51 or
78. This big argument for union has some interesting implica-
tions for the theories of both the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists.2
But before I get to that, I will discuss the Anti-Federalist vi-
sion. I am already simplifying a bit, because of course "Anti-
Federalist" is the label that politicians of 1787 coined in order
to lump together all the folks who opposed ratification of the
Constitution. These folks may have opposed the Constitution
for different reasons, perhaps for inconsistent reasons, just as
some members of today's Federalist Society may agree about
what they do not like but sometimes have a more difficult time
agreeing about what they do like. Nevertheless, for simplicity's
sake they will be categorized together as one group-Anti-
Federalists.
Speaking in broad brush terms about the Anti-Federalists,
theirs was a vision that celebrated localism and feared centrali-
zation of authority. The American Revolution, of course, was a
revolution that had been fought not simply for freedom, but for
localism. "No taxation without representation" was about rep-
• Professor, Yale Law School.
1. For much more detail and general background on the Anti-Federalist vision, see
generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131 (1991).
2. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessonsfor the Old World, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 483 (1991)(elaborating on this big argument and its contemporary
implications).
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resentation in local colonial legislatures, and so that slogan of
the Revolution integrated freedom rhetoric with federalism
rhetoric. The Anti-Federalists carried on the tradition of being
very suspicious of any central government, way off, removed
from ordinary constituents. Whether the government sits in
London or whether it sits in Washington, D.C., it is still quite
far-removed from the folks back home. Thus arose great con-
cern about this new government that was being summoned into
existence-possibly simply to replace the imperial yoke that
had been cast off only a decade before.
Well, did this concern come true, that the Constitution
would centralize all authority and displace the States? Today I
think a lot of us would say yes. Not much is left of state auton-
omy. Thus one could argue that the Anti-Federalists were right
on that one. If they were right, however, they were right only in
the long term and only because of all sorts of subsequent con-
stitutional changes that occurred long after the founding pe-
riod. Until the Civil War, the federal government did not
exercise lots of power. Even if on paperJohn Marshall was will-
ing to read the Commerce Clause3 and other clauses in Article
I, Section 8 fairly broadly, congressional legislation was consid-
erably more restrained-and, indeed, even McCulloch 4 may not
have been quite as expansive as some of us have read it in a
post-Wickard 5 and -Darby,6 post-New Deal world.
So what really accounts for the centralization? The Civil War
accounts for a lot of it. That war was triggered by an expression
of states' rights, but (like most wars) it resulted in a centraliza-
tion of federal executive authority. In the wake of the war, it
became necessary to introduce constitutional amendments that
really restricted the States: the Reconstruction Amendments.'
All this helped pave the way for the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments, which profoundly shifted the balance of power
3. U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, d. 3 (empowering Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)(upholding Congressional
power to create a federal bank).
5. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(holding that a federal wheat quota act
fell within the commerce power of Congress).
6. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941Hsustaining federal power to regulate
production of goods for commerce).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (making
various principles of the Bill of Rights applicable against States and limiting state
power in other ways); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (eliminating discrimination on the basis
of race with respect to the right to vote).
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betweep. state governments and the federal government.8
Some-indeed many-of these centralizing changes involved
the participation of state legislatures. These legislatures, after
all, ratified the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments and
thereby gave away the store that the original Constitution had
kept for them.
. As the constitutional system succeeded in actually creating
an integrated national market, more and more economic activ-
ity became truly interstate in scope. Roads got better and
canals were built. Railroads, telegraphs, and other develop-
ments in the Twentieth Century revolutionized communication
and transportation technology. The idea of a common market
on a new continent succeeded and had the predictable effect of
transferring more power to the central government, which
could coordinate that central economy and thwart local eco-
nomic obstruction. So some of these changes occurred because
of the success of the original vision of the common market for
America and others because of subsequent constitutional
developments.
So much for my first point about centralism versus localism.
My second point is that the Anti-Federalists were especially
concerned with preserving for ordinary citizens the ability to
participate in government. We see that concern most obviously
in the idea of the jury, in which ordinary citizens would be able
to participate; but the Anti-Federalists also liked local govern-
ment generally. Ordinary, respectable members of the commu-
nity, solid citizens who were trusted and admired by others,
were much more likely to be able to serve in a local govern-
ment or a state legislature than in Congress. This was the flip
side of the prediction of The Federalist Number 10, that there
would be a lot more refinement of representation at the con-
gressionallevel than at the state leve1.9 What that meant was
that fewer people would be able to participate in government,
and the Anti-Federalists thought that would be a big loss. They
feared that ordinary citizens would simply become consum-
ers-passive folk ruled by a political elite. This point about or-
dinary citizen participation is thus connected to the earlier
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (authorizing direct income taxation of individuals by the
federal government); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for Senators to be popularly
elected from each State).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83-84 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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point about localism. For most folks even today, to the extent
that they get involved in politics, they get involved at the local
level-th.e city council, the PTA. In the old days they used to
muster in local militia, and there really was a jury of the vici-
nage that served as a vehicle for ordinary citizens to participate;
hence the connection between local government and the idea
of citizen participation.
The citizen participation concern goes along with my third
point-the Anti-Federalist suspicion of professionalism and
specialization of labor. The Anti-Federalists were wary of pro-
fessional politicians always in office; instead, they believed in
rotation of office-holding. One ofThomas]efferson's two big-
gest criticisms of the Constitution was that it lacked a provision
for rotation of office-holding-simply put, the Constitution
didn't impose term limitations. 10 By contrast, the jury idea in-
volved rotation. In the legislative sphere, the basic Anti-Feder-
alist idea was that you serve in the legislature for a while and
then you get out of it and spend some time suffering under the
laws that you had a hand in making.
The Anti-Federalists were suspicious not only of professional
politicians, but also ofall specialization of labor. Specialization,
said The Federalist Number 10, would breed inequality,l1 which
raised problems for democracy-and the Anti-Federalists
tended to be democrats. So, for example, a professional army
was very suspicious because professional soldiers and officers
could promote their own self interest, in ways that might be
inconsistent with the best interests of the general community.
In more modern terms, the Anti-Federalists feared the emer-
gence of a "military-industrial complex." Thus they celebrated
the citizen militia-ordinary folks, again local, organized
around cities and towns keeping a check on the central stand-
ing army. So the militia idea was simply, in the military context,
the analog of the jury idea. In both cases locally-organized folks
participated in government and kept a check on these profes-
sionals, whether judges, or legislators off in Washington, D.C.,
or professional soldiers in the military. Thus, ordinary citizens
took their turn in the militia and the jury kept a check on pro-
10. Jefferson's second criticism was the failure to include a bill of rights in the origi-
nal Constitution. See Letter from ThomasJefferson to James Madison Uuly 31, 1788) in
13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 443 Uulian Boyd ed., 1956).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 84.
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fessional politicians. Once again the states' rights dimension of
all this is evident-local folks keeping check on central officials.
For all these reasons, the Anti-Federalists thought the origi-
nal Constitution needed a bill of rights. The bill of rights they
wanted, however, was not simply a bill of rights to protect indi-
viduals and minorities but also, and perhaps even more funda-
mentally, a bill of rights to protect the States and to protect
certain kinds of intermediate associations.12 The "no taxation
without representation" slogan, the banner of the Revolution,
suggests states' rights and individual rights went hand-in-hand
to a considerable degree.
Let us also recall the Virginia and Kentucky resolves, in
which folks organized at the local level to resist the repressive
federal Sedition Act. 13 Just as in Eastern Europe last summer
when Boris Yeltsin mobilized forces at the state level to combat
the attempted central coup, so too did the Virginia and Ken-
tucky resolves yoke First Amendment and Tenth Amendment
rhetoric. 14 Indeed, the First Amendment argument that the
Anti-Federalists made was in large part a federalism argument:
Congress simply has no enumerated power over speech. The
First Amendment intentionally inverted the language of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which stated that "Congress shall
have Power To ... make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper ...."15 Note how the First Amendment, which read
unlike any other, tracked and reversed this language: "Congress
shall make no law ...,"16 meaning that Congress simply had no
enumerated power over either speech or religion. Indeed,
speech and religion were put together in the original First
Amendment largely for reasons offederalism. Congress had no
enumerated power in either of these domains. No Eighteenth-
Century state constitution combined speech or press with reli-
gion. The federal Constitution did, and here we see this inte-
12. See Amar, supra note 1; see also Panel, The Bill ofRights and Governmental Stnu:ture:
Republicanism and Mediating Institutions, 15 HARv.].L. & PuB. POL'y 99 (1992).
13. THE AllEN AND SEDITION ACTS, 1 Stat. 566, 570, 577, 596 (1798). The Sedition
Act made it a federal crime to criticize incumbent federal officials too vigorously.
14. See, e.g., 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 132 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987) (Kentucky Resolution No.3) (intertwining First and Tenth Amendment
arguments). The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions declared the Alien and Sedition
Acts to be unconstitutional. The resolutions argued that the Sedition Act was in direct
violation of the First Amendment's freedom of speech and the press, as well as an
invasion of rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
16. U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added).
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gration of states' rights and libertarianism. We see this again in
the Second Amendment, which set forth the right to bear arms
and celebrated the state militia. 17 We also see this in the Estab-
lishment Clausel8-Congress was prohibited not only from es-
tablishing a national church, but also from disestablishing a
state church. It simply had no power either way respecting the es-
tablishment of religion-that issue was just left to locals.
Pulling all this together, if we want one central image of the
original Anti-Federalist vision, let's think of the jury.19 The jury
is local rather than central. A jury of the vicinage or district is
not just a jury from within the state, but it is from the commu-
nity. The jury is participatory and involves ordinary citizens
regularly in the process of government. In this respect, the jury
is not so much for the benefit of the defendant or the parties to
a given lawsuit; rather, it is intended to educate the ordinary
citizens who serve on it.20 This is where they learn virtue and
learn how to deliberate with each other. Thejury is non-profes-
sional. Ordinary citizens rotate through; you serve on the jury,
and then you're out of the jury.21
Today thejury is no longer the central image of our constitu-
tional order, even though it was the dominant motifof the orig-
inal Bill of Rights. This is not so much because the Anti-
Federalists were completely right in predicting that the federal
government was going to destroy all these things immediately,
but because American society subsequently changed. We had a
Civil War precipitated in part by an overassertion of states'
rights. The Civil War, unlike the Revolution, was a war in which
the winners were the centralizers suspicious of repressive local-
ism, and so the jury as a local body became less prominent.
Specialization of labor increased, and as a result many people
became unwilling to take their turn serving as jurors because
the personal opportunity cost ofjury service was too high. In
the more complicated Twentieth Century, it is widely believed
17. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
ofa free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. :').
19. See Amar, supra note 1, at 1183-99 (analyzing the role of the jury).
20. See generally 1 ALExIS DE TOCQ,UEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-94 (Vintage
ed. 1945)(1838).
21. The Anti-Federalists thought that the same rotation principle should be applied
in the legislature: you should serve a term and then you should get out for a while and
let someone else take a shot. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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that we need even more specialized professionals. Therefore
there has been a shift away from, for example, the civil jury and
toward the headless bureaucracy fashioning the rules that gov-
ern civil society. This is all largely a reflection of the increasing
specialization of labor.
In the long run, the Anti-Federalists predicted many things
correctly, but they were correct only in the very long term.
Their prediction that the Constitution was going to lead immedi-
ately to consolidation, centralization, and lack of involvement of
ordinary citizens didn't come true.
Let me conclude by shifting gears, moving away from the
Anti-Federalists, and toward The Federalist Papers. Today we fo-
cus on The Federalist Numbers 10 and 51, and Madison's basic
idea that Americans needed a strong central government to
protect citizens against their own state government-to protect
people in Rhode Island against the Rhode Island government's
rage for paper money and other forms of oppression.22 This is
also the tradition of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 But before
the Civil War, no one read The Federalist Number 10 as the cen-
tral Federalist Paper.24 The most common antebellum arguments
for union were rather to be found in The Federalist Numbers 4
through 8.25 The arguments in these papers were accepted be-
cause both Anti-Federalists and Federalists could agree with
them. The Anti-Federalists did not agree with The Federalist
Number 10: In sharp contrast to Madison, Anti-Federalists liked
states better than the federal government. But the argument
from The Federalist Numbers 4 through 8 was that Americans
needed a federal government in order to prevent the states
from warring with each other, and in order to prevent states from
having land borders with each other that would lead to the
buildup of state armies and strongman military figures. All of
this would destroy democracy. So to protect democracy, the
22. Madison argued in both The Federalist Number 10 and in the First Congress that
state governments were more likely to tyrannize minorities than a federal government
because of state governments' greater vulnerability to majoritarian factions. THE FED-
ERAUST No. 10, supra note 9, at 83; see also Amar, supra note I, at 1146-49.
23. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ.
1193 (1992).
24. See DOUGLAS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 75-76 (1974)("Before
[1913], practically no commentator on The Federalist or the Constitution, none of the
biographers of Madison, had emphasized Federalist 10 as of special importance for
understanding our 'more perfect union.' ").
25. For a more elaborate description and analysis of The Federalist Numbers 4 through
8, see Amar, supra note 2, at 486-88.
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states had to combine and rely on a moat called the Atlantic
Ocean to protect them from Europe. They would not need big
armies to protect themselves. Thus the original vision of The
Federalist Numbers 4 through 8 was that a central government
was needed not so much to protect you from your own state,
but to protect you from foreign nations and to prevent the
states from warring against each other. Citizens need protec-
tion from the citizens of other states, not from their own state
government. That is one vision with which both Anti-Federal-
ists and Federalists could agree, which is why it's even more
prominent in The Federalist Papers than Publius' argument in The
Federalist Number 10.26
In conclusion, I invite you to read The Federalist Numbers 4
through 8. Publius would probably be pleased by this sympo-
sium in his honor, but he might be even more pleased if we
were aware of his first and perhaps biggest argument. And even
the Anti-Federalists probably wouldn't mind.
26. Ofcourse, prominence in The Federalist Papers does not necessarily equal primacy
in the minds of the Federalist framers themselves or in the Constitution's basic archi-
tecture. For Madison himself, and for other leading Federalists, the vision of The Feder-
alist Number 10 was indeed critical; but during the ratification process, Publius, at least,
placed the geostrategic argument of The Federalist Numbers 4 through 8 front and,center.
Madison returned to this theme in The Federalist Number 41 where he elaborated upon
the geostrategic argument found in the earlier Federalist Papers. See also JONATIIAN EL-
LIOT, THE DEBATES IN TIlE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TIlE ADOPTION OF TIlE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 527-29 (Taylor & Maury, 1854)(remarks ofJames Wilson at the
Pennsylvania ratifYing convention in 1787).
